Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Government of the United States of America as represented by the National Security Agency Information Systems Security Organization (NSA/ISSO) and the Government of Latvia as represented by the Ministry of Defense

Pertaining to the Provision of SY-71E Communications Security Equipment and Services

1.Purpose and scope

In order to assist in the establishment of a secure voice and data net to protect Implementing Force (IFOR) classified and sensitive information transmitted between SHAPE, IFOR Participating Nations (IFORPN) delegations in Belgium, IFORPN Capitals and IFORPN Forces in Theater in support of the NATO-led coalition to iomplement the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. will loan up to five SY-71E secure voice and data equipment to the Government of Latvia as represented by the Ministry of Defense (hereinafter referred to as MoD), pursuant to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act, as amended; Title 10, United States Code Section 421, and other relevant authorities. This document defines the scope, conditions and responsibilities of the Parties to this MOA concerning this loan arrangement.

2. Definitions

a. Communications Security (COMSEC): The protection resulting from measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from the collection and analysis of telecommunications carrying sensitive or classified information, and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications.

b. Loan: The provision of the SY-71E by the U.S. Government under specified conditions, such that the U.S. Government retains ownership of and title to the equipment (to include the units themselves and any ancillaries, plus associated COMSEC material and operating manuals provided by the U.S.).

c. Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI): Secure telecommunications or information handling equipment, or associated cryptographic component, that is unclassified but governed by a special set of control requirements.

3. General provisions

All activities of the Parties under this MOA shall be carried out in accordance with their national laws. Any costs for support of financial obligations under this MOA are subject to enabling national legislation and the availability of funds appropriated for such purposes.

4. Agreements

a. The U.S. will loan up to five SY-71E secure voice/data equipment to the MoD in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 below to satisfy mutually identified secure telecommunications interoperability requirements between MoD and NATO/SHAPE.

b. The title to the U.S. furnished SY-71E terminals shall remain at all times with the U.S. The receiving party (MoD) shall not transfer possession or permit use of the equipment or the services to another party without the express written authorization of the responsible U.S. national authority. In that regard, the SY-71E terminals loaned to the MoD are for its exclusive use and only for its secure communications with NATO/SHAPE, NATO nations, and other IFORPN. Details concerning the loaned equipment and services provided by the U.S. shall not be revealed in any manner to, or released to, any third country or representative without prior written consent of the responsible U.S. national authorities.

c. The SY-71E loaned to the MoD is to be a CCI. The equipment and associated material are very sensitive and require safeguarding in accordance with the special procedures provided for in this MOA and in any separate referenced documentation.

d. Only COMSEC keying material provided by the Distribution and Accounting Agency NATO (DACAN) will be used with the SY-71E equipment provided under this MOA.

e. The SY-71E will not be subject to any co-operative development, co-production, co-assembly or production licensing agreements.

f. The Parties acknowledge and agree that their performance under this MOA does not violate their national laws, regulations, or policies nor is this MOA to be implemented or interpreted to require any acts or commitments which are in violation of their national laws, regulations, or policies.

5. Responsibilities

a. The U.S. Government shall:

(1) Loan the SY-71E equipment and supporting technical documentation material in quantities mutually agreed to by the respective parties in order to achieve secure interoperability with NATO and IFORPNs as described in Section 1 above.

(2) Provide for the timely provision of loaned SY-71E equipment.

(3) When requested by DACAN, distribute keying material for the SY-71E to MoD through the U.S. Embassy in that nation.

(4) Provide initial training regarding procedures which are required to safeguard, control and manage U.S.-loaned equipment and NATO/U.S. keying material.

(5) Provide initial training regarding the proper methods for operating the SY-71E, to include installation.

(6) Provide for the maintenance of loaned SY-71E equipment.

(7) Inspect, on an irregular basis, the loaned SY-71E equipment and NATO keying material to ensure handling, usage, safeguarding, control and management are in accordance with prescribed NATO procedures and standards, and with other procedures which are agreed by both governments.

b. The MoD shall:

(1) Ensure the U.S.-loaned SY-71E equipment and IFOR keying material are safeguarded and afforded protection commensurate with the effective edition of SDIP-17 (NATO Military Committee Communications and Information Systems Security and Evaluation Agency Doctrine and Information Publication for SY-71E).

(2) Establish a centralized system to distribute, safeguard, control, and manage U.S.-loaned SY-71E equipment and IFOR keying material.

(3) Ensure the U.S.-loaned SY-71E equipment and material are used only for mutually identified IFOR secure interoperability requirements.

(4) Ensure that U.S.-loaned SY-71E equipment and material are not reallocated to any other nation or non-governmental organization.

(5) Ensure that only DACAN-supplied keying material is used.

(6) Arrange for unrestricted access by authorized and duly identified U.S. personnel to the SY-71E and material for necessary maintenance, inspections, and inventories to maintain U.S. accountability.

(7) Ensure that emergency key zeroization procedures are implemented in those instances where the loss, capture, or compromise of the SY-71E equipment or material appears imminent.

(8) Notify the appropriate U.S. authorities in a timely manner of any loss or suspected compromise of U.S.-loaned SY-71E equipment or keying material.

(9) Be responsible for distribution of keying material to the operating locations of the SY-71E.

6. Accountability and control

of exchanged information

a. U.S. SY-71E equipment and IFOR keying material loaned under the terms of this MOA will be safeguarded, controlled and managed in accordance with the accountability and control procedures prescribed in the effective edition of SDIP-17. SDIP-17 doctrine establishes the minimum physical security requirements for the handling and safeguarding of the SY-71E equipment and keying material.

b. It is understood that losses caused by war or natural disasters may be unavoidable. If a particular loss under such circumstances is mutually agreed to have been unavoidable, the MoD, after discussions with the U.S., may be relieved of accountability and liability.

7. Maintenance

The SY-71E loaned under the terms of this MOA will be maintained only by authorized U.S. personnel. Duly authorized and identified U.S. personnel shall be permitted access to the SY-71E equipment and material to perform required maintenance. The MoD shall be notified in advance of those instances in which access by authorized U.S. personnel is necessary. During periods of such access, U.S. personnel can be accompanied by appropriately government-cleared MoD personnel. One-for-one equipment level replacement of malfunctioning SY-71E equipment may be accomplished by authorized MoD personnel.

8. Disputes

All disagreements or disputes between Parties arising under or relating to the terms, interpretation, or application of this MOA, or any subsequent modification(s) shall be resolved only by consultation between Parties at the lowest feasible level and shall not be referred to an individual, a third party, an international tribunal, or any other forum for resolution or settlement.

9. Language

This MOA, along with any subsequent MOA, is executed in English language only.

10. Duration

This MOA and the loan of the SY-71E equipment to the MoD shall continue until terminated by either the U.S. or MoD through written notice 180 days prior to the projected date of termination or within 30 days of the termination of the IFOR operation. Prior to the termination of this MOA, arrangements will be mutually developed that provide for the return of the U.S.-loaned SY-71E equipment, NATO/U.S./IFOR keying material, and all other material on or before the date this MOA is terminated.

11. Review

The terms and conditions of this MOA shall be reviewed upon request by either party.

12. Amendments

Amendments to this MOA will be in writing, mutually agreed to by the Parties, and executed by authorized representatives of MoD and the U.S. Government. A copy of all amendments will be appended to each copy of this document, dated, and consecutively numbered.

13. Annexes

Annexes may be appended and agreed, as necessary, to implement provisions of this MOA.

14. Validation

This MOA shall enter into force on the date it is signed by the authorized representatives of the MoD and the U.S. Government.

Signature:________________Signature: ______________

Name: Thomas J. McDermott__Name: Andrejs Krastiņš

Title: Deputy Director Information__Title: Minister of Defence

Systems Security

Date of Signature: July 9, 1996__Date of Signature: November 1, 1996

For the Government__For the Government of Latvia,

of the United States of America,

NSA/ISSO__MOD